Amartya Sen has developed the so-called capability approach to meet the critique that income on its own is not enough to measure economic inequality. This is because knowledge about people's income does not tell us what they are able to acquire with that income. For example, people with the same income may not have access to health and transportation services, schools and opportunities in the labor market.
Introduction
The capability approach was initially conceived in the 1980s as a new approach to welfare economics. In this approach, Amartya Sen brought together a range of ideas that seemed to be excluded from (or inadequately formulated in) traditional approaches to the economics of welfare. In traditional "welfarism", the distribution of income has been the central focus. Sen (1997) argues, however, that economic inequality is not necessarily the same as income inequality. The reason for this is that knowledge about people's income in it self does not tell us about other things that matter for their welfare. People may be restricted in their choices as a result of discrimination, customs, moral codes, political regime, climate, infrastructure, transport, organization of health care, etc. For example, in many cities the risk of becoming a victim of violence restricts sports and social activities for women.
The capability theory proposed by Sen has been discussed in several papers and books:
see Sen (1980 Sen ( , 1982 Sen ( , 1984 Sen ( , 1985a Sen ( , 1985b Sen ( , 1987 Sen ( , 1992 Sen ( , 1993 Sen ( , 1997 Sen ( , 1998 and Drèze and Sen (2002) ; see also Robeyns (2003) and Robeyns and Kuklys (2005) . Central to the capability theory is the notion of "functions" and "capabilities" (or capability sets). Functions are "beings and doings", that is, various states of human beings and activities that a person can undertake. The capability set represents a person's opportunities to achieve functionings. Thus, while "travelling" is a functioning, the opportunity to travel is an element of the person's capability set. Although Sen is not entirely clear in some of his writings (see for example, Sen, 1992 ), a reasonable interpretation may be that a normative evaluation of well-being should depend both the individuals' achieved functionings and capability sets, where the capability set represents the extent of freedom, whereaw the achieved functionings measure aspects of welfare other than freedom (Sugden, 1993 (Sugden, , p. 1952 .
Recently, there has been a growing interest in empirical studies based on Sen's capability approach: see, for example, the references in Sen (1997) , Kuklys (2005) and Anand et al. (2005 Anand et al. ( , 2008 . These studies address central issues of the capability approach, such as the role of socio-economic environmental factors, the ability of individuals to take advantage of opportunities that are objectively available to them, etc. However, these studies are typically rather loosely related to quantitative economic theory, at least in a concrete and empirically operational way. One obvious reason for this state of affairs is that Sen himself is rather vague on matters regarding structural empirical strategies, and it is far from evident how such strategies should be devised. Specifically, if one goes along with the view that a welfare function should depend on both achieved functions and the capability sets, how should such a function be formulated and justified on theoretical grounds? Unfortunately, Sen does not address empirical methodology, and researchers who attempt to apply the capability approach in an empirical context are left pretty much without any guidance. This void obviously leads to ad hoc procedures, without little theoretical foundation of practical usefulness in empirical settings.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the application of a theoretical and empirical framework, denoted a Random Scale Model (RSM), as strategy for evaluating well-being on the basis of the capability approach. A RSM is based on probabilistic choice theory of how representations of rank orderings of alternatives within a finite set should be formulated and how corresponding choice models should look like.
2 Here, the role of randomness is to allow for uncertainty, noise or unobservables in the representation of the attractiveness of the alternatives. This type of probabilistic choice models has largely been developed by psychologists, dating back at least to Thurstone (1927) . Since the pioneering work of Luce (1959a) and McFadden (1973) , these models have become indispensable in theory and applications of choice behavior in situations where the alternatives are qualitative, or discrete.
In several papers Sen seems to go a long way to endorse an "objective" approach to valuing functionings. But he does not say who should be the ones that should undertake such evaluations. Evidently, one possibility could be a group of selected experts. The methodological issues discussed in this paper do, however, not depend on whether the approach is a "subjectivist" one (based on a sample of individuals) or an "objective" one (based on a sample of selected experts). Here, we discuss how one apply information from rank orderings of functionings to establish a RSM, either by (i) choice data from a sample of agents, where by agent we mean an individual, or a selected expert, (ii) from data on agents'
evaluations of utility levels that correspond to stated income levels, (iii) from data on agents'
reporting utility levels that correspond to stated alternatives. Furthermore, we discuss how welfare measures based on RSM can be constructed and one way to address the issue of inter personal comparisons.
The paper is organized as follows. We section 2 we give a brief review of Sen's Capability Approach. In section 3 we discuss how the key concepts of the capability approach can be reinterpreted to allow for the application of the RSM framework. Section 4 reviews key aspects of the RSM framework. Specifically, we focus on the well known result on how choice-or ranking probabilities for choosing-or rank ordering alternatives depend on the 2 The reason we deviate from using the notion of random utility is to avoid the misunderstanding that we follow a traditional utilitarian approach.
choice set of available alternatives and their attributes, through suitable scale representation of alternatives. In sections 5 we show how the RSM framework can be used to derive different type of welfare measures as functions of the choice set, scale parameters that characterize preferences and depend on income, prices and other attributes that characterize the alternatives. Section 6 discusses an alternative RSM approach, originally proposed by Van
Praag (Van Praag, 1968) , and which is known as the Leyden School approach. Van Praag's approach is based on the dual preference or utility representation, which may in fact be interpreted as a random expenditure function representation. Section 7 contains a brief description of an approach that is similar to the one proposed by the Leyden School.
A brief review of the capability approach
The capability approach is a theoretical framework that put emphasis on the importance of freedom to achieve well-being and that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people's opportunities to choose and be. It is Amartya Sen who pioneered the approach and several others who have significantly developed it. For an introduction to the capability approach and how the approach has been applied in practice, see Robeyns (2003 Robeyns ( , 2006 .
Central in the capability approach is the concept of functioning. Functionings are defined as 'beings and doings', that is, various states of human beings and activities that a person can undertake. Examples of the former (the 'beings') are "being well-nourished", "being housed in a particular kind of house or apartment", "having obtained a specific education", and "being illiterate". Examples of 'doings' are "travelling", "caring for a child", "voting in an election", "consuming a specific amount goods", "choosing particular leisure activities", "consumption of energy for heating", and "participating in the labor market".
These examples indicate that many features of a person could be described either as a being or as a doing: we can say that a person is housed in a pleasantly warm house, or that this person does consume lots of energy to keep her house warm. Yet other functionings are much more straightforwardly described as either a being or a doing, for example being healthy or choosing a particular education.
A second key concept is termed capability. Capabilities-or the capability setrepresents a person's opportunities to achieve functionings. Thus, while travelling is a functioning, the opportunity to travel is an element of the person's capability set. The capability approach views functionings and capabilities as the best metric for most kinds of interpersonal evaluations. In Sen's original terminology, the notion of capability (or capability set) is equivalent to the set of functionings available to the individual (choice set). 3 However, as Robeyns (2003) and Robeyns and Kuklys (2005) have pointed out, the notion of capability has been used in several different ways in the theoretical literature. 4 Robeyns (2003) also note that Sen in his later writings has used different definitions of capability.
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A third concept used in the capability approach is the notion of conversion factors.
The relation between a good and the achievement of certain beings and doings is represented by a "conversion factor", which is defined as the degree in which a person can transform a resource into a functioning. For example, a person who is handicapped or someone who was never taught to ride a bike has a very low conversion factor as regards to riding a bike.
The notions of capability set and conversion factor thus allow non-utility information that is excluded by traditional utilitarianism to be accounted for. This includes for example a person's additional physical needs, due to being physically disabled, for example.
A frequent misunderstanding in the secondary literature concerns the use of the term freedom. Especially in his more recent work, Sen often equates capabilities with freedoms, without always specifying in more detail what kind of freedoms he is referring to. A careful reading of Sen's work clarifies that capabilities are freedoms conceived as real opportunities (Sen 1985a) . For Sen, capabilities as freedoms refer to the presence of valuable options or alternatives, in the sense of opportunities that do not exist only formally or legally, but are also effectively available to the individual.
A reinterpretation of key concepts of the capability approach
As mentioned above, the motivation of Sen's capability approach stems from some problematic aspects of standard welfare theory. As mentioned above, traditional welfare analysis focuses on resources such as income and neglects important aspects related to 3 As Sen (1998, p. 15) writes: "A person's capability is, then, given by the set of alternative functioning vectors, from which the person can choose any one vector." 4 For example, Nussbaum (1999) has labelled potential functionings "capabilities". Nussbaum also distinguishes between basic capabilities, internal capabilities, and combined capabilities. A basic capability set consists of the basic capabilities of human beings, such as the ability to reason, to imagine, to eat and speak, etc. An internal capability set represents restrictions on the set of capabilities that come from internal physical and psychological factors due to handicaps, deformed preferences and fears, such as the inability to break out of a violent relationship. A combined capability set represents restrictions due to both internal psychological factors and restrictions imposed by the family, social and religious conventions and the legal system. 5 In his formalism, Sen (1985a, pp. 11-15) distinguishes between the commodity vector, the characteristics of the commodities and the utilization function (which is the different patterns of use of the characteristics associated with the commodities). This may be fine in a theoretical discussion for the sake of clarifying concepts, but it is questionable whether it is very helpful in the context of making the theory operational in practice.
"qualitative" alternatives and restrictions on the set of available alternatives that matter for Recall that according to Sen's terminology, functionings are "beings" and "doings", and the capabilities are the feasible functionings. Furthermore, functionings may either encompass beings or doings, or both. Obviously the "doings" can be viewed as choice alternatives, suitably defined. The interpretation of "beings" is somewhat more unclear. As exemplified in section 2, 'beings' may be "being well-nourished", "being housed in a comfortable house", "having obtained a specific education", "being illiterate", can all be interpreted as achieved (most preferred) alternatives, provided one has defined the choice constraints properly. By an achieved alternative it is meant the most preferred-or chosen alternative-subject to the individual choice constraints. However, a careful reading of Sen indicates that "beings", similarly to "doings" may also be understood to be "potential beings"
(that is, alternatives within the choice set), and not necessarily chosen ones. Consequently, it may seem that the capability theory allows for a rather flexible interpretation of beings.
In this paper we define the capability set (called choice set) as the set of available alternatives, where each alternative is a functioning. The choice sets may be individualspecific. Evidently, there is no essential loss of generality in defining the alternatives in such a 6 In his earlier writings Sen seems to view preferences as related only to mental states, to be interpreted either in terms of pleasure or in terms of desire. He also argues that choice alternatives cannot always be rank ordered in a manner perfectly consistent with that assumed by traditional utility theory. However, as Sugden (1993) points out, a more general interpretation is possible in which preferences are viewed as the mental states that precede choice. Thus, to prefer alternative b to c (say), is to be in a state of mind in which one is disposed to choose b rather than c. This interpretation is clearly closer to common usage in contemporaneous economic theory. In later writings however, such as Sen (1997) , he acknowledges that modern usage of utility theory can be interpreted more broadly.
way that the alternatives become mutually exclusive because this is solely a matter of suitably decomposition of the space of functionings.
Thus, a person's choice set is supposed to account for the individual's ability, capability or will to take advantage of the opportunities offered to her or him. The alternatives in the choice set may be characterized by a vector of characteristics (attributes), cf. Gorman (1956) and Lancaster (1966) . The agent (individual, or selected expert) is viewed as having preferences over the universal set of alternatives, where the alternatives may be very general, as exemplified above. As a result, the agent's preferences can be represented by a scale function (utility function), as we shall elaborate in detail in the next section. The value of the chosen alternative (functioning) will consequently be the maximum of the scale function, subject to the choice set. The capability-or choice set-may be interpreted as either the set of alternatives that are objectively available to the individual, or, alternatively, as the set (subjective) of opportunities that are effectively available to the individual in the sense that she or he is able to make fully use of all the options in the choice set, consistent with the notion of conversion mentioned above. In concrete empirical applications the extent to which the researcher is able to accommodate conversion aspects may depend on how detailed information one has about individual abilities and health status, as well as about the choice environment.
RSM and probabilistic choice models
A Random Scale Model stems from a theory about stochastic scale representations of rank orderings of alternatives, and how the probability of the most preferred alternative can be characterized, as a function of the scales and the choice set. The RSM is analogous to Random Utility Models (RUM) that was originally developed by psychologists, pioneered by Thurstone (1927) . Whereas the random utility models have been developed to analyze individual choice behavior, a RSM may have a wider interpretation and applications that not necessarily are explicitly related to choice behavior in the traditional sense. The fact that the scales involved are random is of particular relevance both for choice and scaling models because it allows the researcher to accommodate aspects, or variables, that are unobservable to her or him. Note that an empirical model is also needed in the case of Sen's objective approach, because a sound methodology is necessary to accommodate the fact that different members of the selected expert group may rank functionings differently.
To fix ideas, we shall now recapitulate some key concepts and developments within the probabilistic choice theory, and which are directly useful for the RSM we have in mind.
Consider a countable set, S, of "universal" choice alternatives. By this we mean that S is the absolute maximal set of alternatives that are relevant, regardless of whether or not they are available to every agent in the population. Consider a particular agent (for simplicity we drop the indexation of the agent for now) with choice set C, possibly agent specific. For some agents C may be equal to S but in most contexts the choice set will be a proper subset of S.
The agent is assumed to have preferences over the alternatives in S. A central part of the theory is how choices from one choice set are related to choices from another choice set,
given that preferences remain fixed. In particular, Luce (1959a) and subsequently others have proposed an axiomatic approach to obtain theoretically justified structures on the choice probabilities. Luce (1959a) proposed a fundamental axiom that is known as "Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives" (IIA). One way of presenting the axiom goes as follows: Let ( ) J C denote the choice function, that is, the index of the most preferred alternative in C. As indicated above, the choice function ( ) J C is perceived as stochastic due to taste variables that are unobserved to the researcher but known to the agent, and variables that are uncertain to the researcher as well as to the agent in the sense that future tastes may fluctuate in a way that is not foreseeable by the agent. Then for choice sets A and C such that j A C S,
The relation in (1) states that the probability of choosing j from C, given that the most preferred alternative belongs to A is equal to the probability of choosing j when A is the choice set. Note that it is implicit in the notation that the probability on the right hand side of
does not depend on alternatives in \ ; C A they are irrelevant. The statement in (1) is clearly a rationality assertion. Note that since it is a probabilistic statement it does not mean that IIA need to hold in every single experiment. Instead it is meant to hold on average, when the choice experiment is replicated a large number of times, or alternatively, it should hold on average in a large sample of "identical" agents. (In the sense of agents with identically distributed tastes.) We may therefore think of IIA as an assumption of "probabilistic rationality". Another way of expressing IIA is that the rank ordering within any subset of the choice set is, on average, independent of alternatives outside the subset. Then it follows that the choice probability that follows from utility maximization, namely
is equal to the expression on the right hand side of (2). In other words, this random utility representation is consistent with the choice probabilities that follow from IIA. 9 Similar to the discussion above, the error terms , , j j S ε ∈ represent possible unpredictable variations in the agent's tastes across replications of identical choice experiments. Alternatively, the error terms can be interpreted as representing unobserved variations in tastes across agents. In fact, a more realistic scenario is that the random error terms may represent unobserved taste variations across agents as well as agent-specific temporal uncertainty in tastes.
The model in (2) is the well-known Luce model - Luce (1959a ) -that McFadden (1973 developed into a practical econometric framework known as the Multinomial Logit 8 The distributional assumption assumed here is equivalent to the assumption that log j ε has c.d.f. exp( exp( )).
one is the relevant one in a corresponding additive formulation of the utility function. 9 The approach taken here is somewhat analogous to Sen (1991) where he proposes an axiom system to characterize preferences over choice sets. However, whereas IIA yields an explicit functional form characterization of the choice model in terms of preference terms and choice set, Sen does not demonstrate how his axioms can lead to operational results of relevance for empirical relations.
model -see, for example, McFadden (1973 McFadden ( , 1984 McFadden ( , 2001 representing the mean preferences, may be individual-specific. In empirical analysis, the term j v will often be specified as a function of observed characteristics of the agent and observed attributes of alternative j, such as alternative-specific prices and possibly other attributes characterizing the alternatives.
Once the systematic terms of the scale function have been specified one can estimate the unknown parameters in the specification using well-known methods, such as the maximum likelihood procedure. The estimated model, represented by choice probabilities as in (2), can be applied for conducting policy simulation experiments to assess the effect on choice behavior by changing the choice/capability set C, or by changing some or all of the attributes in the systematic parts, { }, 
, for a discussion of this methodology. In SP surveys individuals are asked to make choices, or alternatively to state the rank ordering of hypothetical alternatives presented. The advantage of the SP method is that it enables the analyst to obtain information about agents' rank orderings among all alternatives in a stated choice set, and not just the most preferred one, by asking questions on preference rankings in hypothetical choice situations.
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Suppose for notational simplicity that the choice set consists of four alternatives: that is, C = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let ( , , ) C Q h j k be the probability that alternative h is the most preferred, alternative j is the second most preferred and alternative k is the third most preferred. Then
We notice that (3) can be expressed as
The interpretation of the right-hand side of (4) is quite intuitive. It tells us that the ranking of the alternatives in C can be interpreted as if the agent first selects alternative h as the most preferred one from C, second selects alternative j as the most preferred one from the remaining alternatives in C\{h} and finally selects k as the most preferred one from the final remaining alternatives in C\{h, j}.
We have seen above that the probabilistic choice theory offers new opportunities to relax the rather strong consistency assumptions so central to conventional deterministic utility theory. As is well known, the motivation of psychologists such as Thurstone (1927) for proposing a random utility framework was to deal with the observational fact that individuals often violate transitivity when faced with replications of (seemingly) identical choice experiments. His explanation was that decision-makers may be ambiguous about the precise value of the respective alternatives, in the sense that if the same choice setting is repeated they may choose a different alternative. This unpredictable temporal variation in tastes is represented by the stochastic error terms in the utility representation. However, at each moment in time (each choice setting presented) the agent (individual or member of the expert group) will of course choose the alternative that maximizes momentary utility. Thus the socalled random utility -or discrete choice -theory initiated by Thurstone (1927) , and further developed by Luce (1959a) , McFadden and others, is particularly designed to allow for this type of seemingly bounded rational behavior. Moreover, par of this theory has been developed with particular reference to practical methods for carrying out empirical analyses in cases where the choice set is discrete, see McFadden (2001) .
Due to the random terms in the utility function, we realize that this type of stochastic choice models imply patterns of intransitivity. 11 In particular, the Luce model presented above is consistent with the following type of cyclical behavior: Let j, k and r be any three alternatives in S. For short, let ( , ) ( ({ , }) ), P j k P J j k j = = that is, ( , ) P j k is the probability of preferring j over k. Then the Luce choice model implies the so-called product rule, namely 11 Violations of transitivity may also be a problem within Sen's "objective" approach based on evaluations by selected experts. This is because there is no guarantee that different experts will share the same opinion about rank orderings of alternatives. In fact, it will often be the case that different members of the expert group rank alternatives differently.
(5) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ), P j k P k r P r j P j r P r k P k j = see Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 350) . The intuition behind the product rule is as follows:
Suppose an agent is making binary choices from the set { , , }. j k r If we let f denote "preferred to", the left hand side of (5) is the probability of the intransitive chain , j k r j f f f and the right hand side of (5) is the probability of the intransitive chain . j r k j f f f Thus, the product rule can be interpreted as a particular assertion about cyclical behavior, namely that an intransitive chain in one direction is not more probable than an intransitive chain in another direction.
Latent choice sets
The framework outlined above can readily be extended to the setting with latent choice sets, as developed by Ben-Akiva and Watanatada (1981), Dagsvik (1994) and follows that the probability that the agent will choose elemental alternative k in region j is equal to
Note that the expressions on the right hand side of (6) do not depend on k because the observing researcher has no information about the elemental alternatives, and they therefore have equal probability of being selected, as perceived by the researcher. From this it follows that the probability of choosing to live in region j is given by
where ( ) J C denotes the choice of region from C. We note that the choice probability in (7) (of the observable choice) has a form where the representative scale terms are weighted by the size of the respective choice set of elemental alternatives. Although the terms {n j } are unobservable, they can be represented by variables characterizing the size of the choice sets of elemental alternatives. How, depends on the specific topic being studied.
Discrete/Continuous choice
In many choice situations a discrete choice is made jointly with an associate continuous choice. For example, a worker may face the decision problem of which job to choose and how many hours to work, (conditional on the choice of job). Another example is a consumer that considers purchasing electric versus gas appliances, as well as how much electricity or gas to In some of his writings Sen suggests that evaluation of well-being is a function of both the chosen functioning and the capability set (Sugden, 1993) . Sen even argues that in some instances capabilities may be more relevant than functionings (Sen, 1992, p. 41) . Given that we accept Sen's argument, the challenge is thus how an index of well-being shall be constructed that accommodates these requirements. Fortunately, in modern choice theory this aspect has been dealt with, namely by applying the concept of constrained indirect utility function, which is the utility of the most preferred alternative in the choice set C. The corresponding scale in our case will be the scale of the achieved alternative in C (the indirect random scale function), which is the maximum of the scale function taken over the alternatives in the choice set.
As reviewed in section 3, we shall adopt Thurstone's setting by interpreting the random terms of the scale function as random to the agent himself, in the sense that under repetition of seemingly identical choice experiments the agent may choose different alternatives on each occasion due to his difficulties with evaluating the precise value of the alternatives once and for all. Bear in mind, therefore, that although the agent maximizes the momentary scale function, the error terms may change over repeated choice settings. Now it follows from the distributional assumptions above that
Thus, the result above implies that where y is income, j w is the cost of alternative j, j z is a vector of alternative j-specific attributes other than cost, X is a vector of individual characteristics and g is a suitable function.
In the case of discrete/continuous choice settings, the function ( , , ) j j j g y w z X − will also depend on the vector of prices, p, (say) of the (implicit) continuous goods, but for notational simplicity we shall suppress these prices in the notation. From duality theory and suitable regularity conditions we know that ( , , ), Here, we have abstracted from concrete practical aspects on how alternatives, choice sets, costs, non-pecuniary attributes and characteristics should be defined and how the corresponding data should be collected. These issues are by no means a simple task in the context of welfare analysis. In this paper, we shall simply assume that these problems have (11) or (12), depend on the entire choice set, in contrast to the traditional theory. It follows from conventional deterministic utility theory that the indirect utility will only depend on the choice set in cases where the highest-ranked alternative in S is not contained in the choice set C. Otherwise it will be independent of the choice set. Consequently, in the conventional theory the indirect utility does not depend on the choice set apart from in special cases. Sen argues that even when alternatives that are ranked lower than the currently chosen one are removed from the choice set, the agent may still experience a psychological loss of "freedom".
Thus the RSM approach proposed in this paper has the advantage of accommodating this feature, and it offers a possible interpretation of how and why welfare evaluation in this case will depend on the entire capability set and how a corresponding representation of the indirect scale function looks like. The reason why the mean constrained indirect scale function depends on the choice set in our approach stems from the property that the random scale function depends on stochastic terms. Intuition suggests that since the error terms may fluctuate randomly across replications of choice experiments, then in some instances agents may not be constrained in their choice, whereas in other instances they may be constrained.
As a result, the mean constrained indirect scale function will depend on the choice set. In contrast, if perfect transitivity were to hold, then the welfare function would not depend on C if the highest-ranked alternative in S belonged to C.
One possible explanation for the seemingly irrational perceptions of experiencing a loss of freedom when alternatives other than the most preferred one are removed from the choice set, may be the following: Since the agents' preferences are uncertain in the sense of Thurstone, they know that there is a chance that they may revise the scale evaluations of the alternatives several times in the future. Accordingly, the alternative that is chosen currently may not be the most preferred one at all future points of time, due to the influence of whims in perceptions and problems with assessing the precise value of the alternatives once and for all. Another alternative, other than the chosen one, may thus be the most preferred one at some future point in time. The above argument is applicable in the general case in which the error terms are interpreted as representing intra-as well as inter-agent randomness (due to unobservable variables that affect tastes).
A modified income distribution
In many instances it is of interest to apply distributional measures such as the income distribution or the Gini coefficient. This is because a single aggregate welfare function of the type discussed above does not discriminate between cases where there is great inequality or little inequality as long as the (weighted) sum of the constrained indirect scales are the same.
In this subsection we shall discuss how one can applied the approach discussed above to formulate a modified income distribution that takes into account that different individuals have different capabilities/choice sets. To this end we assume that (15) we see that the expenditure required to maintain utility level u when the choice set changes from C to 0 C is equal to
The left hand side of (16) is the money metric measure of mean welfare change for population group with characteristics X when the capability set changes from C to 0 . 
Y Y e u w z X e u w z X = − − % The modified income is thus the income adjusted for the welfare loss (or gain) due to restrictions on the capability set relative to the reference capability set 0 . C
Consequently, it will be possible that the modified income distribution has a heavier tail than the income distribution, or vice versa, depending on the distribution of the capability sets and the correlation between incomes and the capability sets.
The functional form given in (13) has been chosen because it implies that income becomes separable from the other variables entering the indirect random scale. It is an empirical question how realistic this functional form assumption is in applications.
Example
In this example we focus on how to accommodate the impact of violence on women's behavior in urban areas after dark. Consider a particular woman and consider all possible social, entertainment, cultural and leisure activities. Let S be the index set of this list of combinations of these activities (functionings). The woman faces a choice set C, say, of feasible combinations of activities that may be less than S because she may be reluctant to go out after dark. That is, the alternatives in \ S C are viewed as not available by the woman due to the risk of becoming a victim of violence. Let j U be the scale of activity j and assume for simplicity in this example that where y is income, j w is the cost of activity j, X includes age and other relevant individual characteristics and θ and j δ are unknown parameters. The probability that the woman will choose activity j from C is therefore given by
For the sake of identification we need to normalize such that 1 δ , say, is equal to zero. Provided that we have a sample of individual observations on women's choices we can estimate the unknown parameters θ and { }. ( , , )
Furthermore, it follows that the corresponding modified income distribution is given by
Towards a more general characterization of the welfare function
Whereas the indirect scale function discussed above can be used to represent rank orderings of alternatives, it cannot without further assumptions be taken as a representation of welfare that accommodates interpersonal comparisons, apart from in particular cases where income enters in a separable way in the indirect constrained scale function, as discussed in the previous section. We shall now apply principles from the theory of meaningfulness, as developed by Roberts and Rosenbaum (1986) , and Aczél and Roberts (1989) to propose a characterization of the welfare function in more general cases. Luce (1959b) 
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A fundamental assumption we shall now postulate is that it is meaningful to assert, for any c > 0, ( , , , ) w z DC Dy and ( ', ', ' , ' ),
W w z D C D y cW w z DC Dy =
The statement in (23) means that one believes it is meaningful to assert that a change of input variables from ( , , , ) w z DC Dy to ( ', ', ' , ' ) w z D C D y implies some relative change of welfare;
in this case equal to 1. c − For example, if c = 2, (23) asserts that it is meaningful to say that a change of input from ( , , , ) w z DC Dy to ( ', ', ' , ' ) w z D C D y yields a welfare level that is twice as high as the original level. Roberts and Rosenbaum (1986) , demonstrate that the assumption of meaningfulness in (23) implies that the welfare function is measured on a ratio scale. It now follows from Corollary 3.2 of Aczél and Roberts (1989) that the log welfare function is equivalent to a weighted arithmetic mean, i.e., 
Stated Preference data and the Leyden School approach
We have seen that the RSM approach we have outlined offers a powerful method for accommodating key aspects of Sen's capability approach. In the context of welfare measurement, our methodological approach assumes that data on agents' choices related to every relevant aspect of life are available. In practice, this may be difficult for several reasons.
For example, people are usually constrained by the social, religious, climatic and political conditions of the country in which they live. In some countries climatic conditions produce heavy rainfall and flooding or periods of severe drought. Since many people cannot choose to go to another country or even another part of the country, it is hard to obtain revealed preference data on choices among, say, different climatic and political conditions.
In this section we shall discuss a method based on SP data that was originally proposed by van Praag and associates (Leyden School approach) and has recently been extended by . This method does not require data on ranking of alternatives. The original approach attributed to the Leyden School was developed by van Praag (1968 Praag ( , 1971 Praag ( , 1991 Praag ( , 1993 . Other contributions include van Herwaarden et al. (1977) , van Herwaarden and Kapteyn (1981) and Kapteyn and Wansbeck (1985) . We shall now give a brief summary of the approach of .
Assume an RSM and welfare function as discussed above. Let the expenditure function Y C (u) be defined by ( ( )) .
C C
V Y u u = Note that since the scale function is random, so is the expenditure function. Evidently, since ( ( )) ,
V Y u u = it follows from (10) due to the assumption of extreme value distributed random error terms that the c.d.f. of ( ) is the expenditure necessary for achieving welfare level u j , j = 1, 2, …, 6. This means that one can interpret the income levels the respondents report in the survey as realizations of the random variables Y(u j ), j = 1, 2, …, 6, for each individual respondent. The welfare levels the respondents associate with the questions in the survey are to be interpreted as the respective (current) mean utility levels in the population. Thus, to the extent that agents may perceive these levels differently, is here captured by the random component of the expenditure function.
In the theoretical development in this paper we have only considered the indirect scale for a given income and the corresponding expenditure function for a given welfare level. Thus this theoretical framework cannot without further assumptions be applied to the type of SP data collected by the Leyden School approach. To this end have developed an appropriate extension where the scale is viewed as a stochastic process of income: that is, a stochastic process with income as parameter. The corresponding dual representation is the expenditure function as a stochastic process with scale level as parameter.
In this paper, however, we shall not discuss further details of the approach taken by . For expository simplicity, assume therefore in the following that we have answers that correspond only to one of the scale levels. With independent observations on the expenditure function, one could use the method of maximum likelihood based on the probability density in (28) Specifically, a key point of the Leyden School approach is that it allows the researcher to assess the extent of how perceived well-being depends on current achieved income level. This is obtained by introducing, for example, current income as an independent variable in the regression relation mentioned above, through the specification of log . 
C S
∈ If the capability set contains many alternatives, however, this does not seem practical.
But suppose now that the researcher has only a few selected policy simulation experiments 12 The random term η has mean equal to Euler's constant, 0.5772.., and variance equal to 2 / 6. π (scenarios) in mind, regarding the welfare effect of changing capabilities. Suppose, moreover, that these counterfactual capabilities consist of a modification of the original ones (which may be unobserved by the researcher), in that selected alternatives are added to or removed from the capability set, corresponding to the respective scenarios of interest. One could then carry out separate SP surveys corresponding to each specific scenario and subsequently estimate the scenario-specific values of . C H However, given that one is satisfied with the reduced form representation, one can apply C H as dependent variable in a regression analysis with suitable individual characteristics and regional characteristics as independent variables.
It is clear that the Leyden School approach discussed above applies equally well to a setting where the sample of individuals is replaced by members of an expert evaluation panel and where each member of the panel is exposed to the SP questionnaire, as explained above.
Welfare measurement based on life satisfaction data
Several researchers have conducted surveys in which individuals are interviewed about their overall life satisfaction on, for example, a six-point scale, see Anand et al. (2005 Anand et al. ( , 2008 . V y is the corresponding deterministic part, we obtain that the probability that an agent will report satisfaction level j is equal to
Under the assumptions made in the previous section it follows from (30) that As with the Leyden School approach, the methodology outlined in this section can obviously also be used where data are obtained from expert panel evaluations.
Conclusion
A fundamental motivation behind Sen's capability approach is the fact that economic inequality is not necessarily the same as income inequality, because income may not always
be informative about what people get from their income. In this paper we have addressed the challenge of formulating a structural decision-theoretic framework that is suitable for analyzing and assessing economic inequality based on Sen's capability theory and appropriate data. The point of departure is stochastic choice theory, in which the representation of preferences in terms of random scale functions is crucial. We have argued that the probabilistic feature of the theory of discrete choice allows for a representation of rank ordering of alternatives, either by individuals or evaluation experts, that avoids the strict assumption of transitivity. Furthermore, we have discussed how this theory allows for tractable representations of the value of the most preferred alternative (constrained indirect scale) that accommodates qualitative attributes of the choice alternatives (functionings) and choice sets (capabilities). Subsequently, we have discussed how one can establish tractable welfare measures that, in addition to being a function of income and prices, depend on the capability set, as well as on observable attributes (if such exist) of the functionings in the capability set. We have also discussed how a dual approach, based on the notion of random expenditure function and similar to the Leyden School approach, can be applied to obtain welfare measurements, provided that suitable SP data are available. Finally, we have considered how an RSM can be applied to estimate welfare representations in the case where one has data on life satisfaction.
Appendix
In it is argued on the basis of behavioral axioms and some empirical evidence that the functional form of g in some instances should be a power function, that is (A.1) 
